In Blanche v. Lau, No. 25-429, the Court on 23 June vacated a Second Circuit ruling and sent the case back for further proceedings. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for a 6-3 majority joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.
The case concerns Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese citizen who became a lawful permanent resident in 2007. The Court's opinion said New Jersey charged Lau with trademark counterfeiting in May 2012. While awaiting trial, he temporarily left the United States for China and returned the next month. Lawful permanent residents are generally treated as already admitted when they return from temporary travel, but 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) contains an exception for residents who have committed certain offences identified in the inadmissibility provisions, including crimes involving moral turpitude, a legal category for offences treated as inherently dishonest or depraved. AP and SCOTUSblog both described the ruling as a government win in a dispute over the rights of green-card holders accused of crimes.
The border officer did not treat Lau as already admitted. Instead, the officer paroled him into the country, meaning he could physically enter without formal admission. After Lau later pleaded guilty to the trademark-counterfeiting charge, the government began removal proceedings and charged him as an applicant for admission who was inadmissible because of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Second Circuit had held that border officers needed clear and convincing evidence at the time of return before treating a lawful permanent resident as seeking admission. The Supreme Court rejected that approach. The majority said the relevant statutory scheme permitted the government to satisfy its burden at the removal hearing, based on the evidence produced there, rather than requiring the border officer to have the same proof at the airport.
That holding is narrower than some shorthand descriptions will make it sound. The Court did not decide whether Lau's trademark-counterfeiting offence was in fact a crime involving moral turpitude. It also did not order his removal. It vacated the Second Circuit's judgment and remanded the case, leaving further proceedings to apply the opinion.